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6221/83

30 August 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED]
Chief, Technology Transfer Assessment Center

SUBJECT : Your Questions on the SWDR Describing Soviet
Access to US Data Bases [REDACTED]

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1. Soviet Bloc and Chinese access to unclassified Western computerized S&T data bases is a problem, the magnitude of which remains largely unknown. We are sure, however, that both nations consider it a valuable source of information and of priority importance to ensure continued access. In fact, we include their access to Western data bases as a portion of our awareness briefing. [REDACTED]

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2. Of concern are three categories of unclassified information--government controlled information, commercial proprietary information, and information openly available through subscription. Information in the third category is generally of a fairly basic nature and is normally available to the Communist World through direct subscription to the various journals or abstracting services. A need for timeliness and convenience of access, and more importantly the ability to search out, collate and manipulate data references dictates the computerized data base approach to such information. If the Soviet Bloc and Chinese users can also manage to break into controlled and proprietary data bases through this method, they will gain access to sensitive data concerning plans and programs and the design, performance, and costs of military and industrial systems and equipment. [REDACTED]

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3. DoD has recently completed a contractor study concerning this problem but they are still not sure how to deal with the problem. [REDACTED]

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4. There is an interagency working group charged with addressing the problem of Soviet access to Western data bases. The group was started by Bo Denysyk of Commerce about a year ago, and is now chaired by John Boidock of Commerce. The group was originally formed to oversee the expenditure of \$400K in Commerce contractual funds for a possible Rand Corporation study concerning access to Western data bases. With evaporation of those funds, the ~~sense of direction~~ of the group seems to have been lost. A subsequent proposed contractual effort on the security of computerized data bases by DOE at LANL is stalled for want of funding.

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5. TTAC has been working closely with NSA and DO, both of which are doing a good job of collection on the problem. Through both organizations, we are attempting to define the magnitude of the Communist World data base access problem more accurately.

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6. What remains to be addressed is the question of what to do about the problem. For example, Lockheed's DIALOG system is one of the most widely used commercial data bases. As of December 1982, it had 19,000 subscribers in more than 60 countries. Major entry (i.e., Gateway) ports such as Radio Austria offer access to networks such as TELENET, TYMNET, ARPANET, and EURONET, among others. From these almost any commercial data base, including Commerce's NTIS, can be entered. Anyone can subscribe to Radio Austria's service directly or through a cut-out organization. Likewise, the Chinese, either directly, or through a cut-out organization, can subscribe to any of the commercial services. At the moment it appears that the greatest opportunities for denial of data base access by the West lie in the areas of controlled or proprietary data services.

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7. In the longer run, the US Government should scrutinize the types of information it releases through NTIS and other information services. There really is little reason why we release a lot of the DoD sponsored defense contract work. The public has little need to know in many areas including those you noted in the SWDR article. The DoD is attempting to identify these areas, but creating another classified procedure is a slow process. [REDACTED]

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Chief
Technology Transfer Assessment Center

Attachments:
As stated

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